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Let us suppose that, the time of year being March and the place 
somewhere in the North of England, a jaded business man is told that he must 
take a week's holiday. Five minutes later, being found in a brown study, he 
explains that he is ' thinking' whether to go to Cornwall or to the Lakes. Now, 
such a statement may describe at least two kinds of experience, only one of 
which is, to my mind, genuine thinking. His 'mind's eye' may have conjured 
up for him first the swirling greens and purples of the sunny Atlantic, then the 
peaceful snow-covered Langdales: he may feel again the sun's warmth as he 
lazily sprawls on Mullion cliffs or the sting of the wind and the pull on his 
muscles as he negotiates the Pillar. Finally, the appeal of one place or the 
other toppling him over, he sends his telegram North or South, and our 
interest in him ceases. 
Now, allowing oneself passively to be tossed hither or thither by 
competing memories until, finally, one is cast up on some shore or other, 
though a common way of arriving at a decision, is not, I submit, thinking. Yet 
let us suppose that our friend, realising that to him the chief appeal of 
Cornwall is its lazy warmth, of Cumberland its exhilarating activity, that the 
first involves a long day's journey, the second an afternoon's, that the one 
holiday will be expensive, the other cheap, remembers that he has only a 
week, a slender purse, and an urgent desire for violent exercise. If, then, on 
the grounds of time, money and health, he chooses the Lakes, he may 
justifiably claim that he has "thought the matter out."  Now what 
psychological processes does this involve? 
In such an experience there seem to be the following salient features: 
(i) Recall of past experiences; perhaps a faithful recall, but more 
probably one which is the result of processes of selection, condensation and 
the like. 
(ii) Abstraction of their relevant aspects, under the guidance of conscious 
or unconscious directive tendencies, of which logical thinking and the 
mechanism known as the 'censorship' are special examples. 
(iii) Comparison of those experiences, with the discovery of their 
likenesses and differences. 
(iv) Re-comparison, with some aim or aims in view. 
(v) Combination of the results of this comparison into some conclusion 
which is new for the individual himself. 
(vi) Expression of this conclusion to others, or to himself, in speech, 
writing, gesture or action. 
I am inclined to believe that unless in (v) the conclusion is new for the 
individual, it cannot without ambiguity be termed a result of thinking. 
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Like Dr Thomson, and for the same reason, I find it difficult to put thinking 
and habit into the same category. When an acquaintance says "Good 
morning" to you, it is unwise to take this as a proof of his 'thoughtfulness,' for 
(or of) you; as an expression of his earnest wish that during the present 
forenoon everything will go well. And such caution is certainly to be advised 
if, as sometimes happens, his remark be made in the evening. To call such a 
person absent-minded surely implies our belief that in this case his language 
mechanism, or language habit, did not express his thinking. 
3.  THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THINKING AND ITS EXPRESSION. 
But the conclusion in (v) may be unexpressed, or only partly expressed, 
verbally by the thinker to himself. The thinking may be ' image-less,' and 
wordless. Its expression, or the way in which it issues and records itself for 
others, is commonly in words. But this thinking and the expression of thought 
are as distinguishable as skating from the figure skated. We do not refer to an 
'8' on the ice as skating but we call it a skated figure. And for a similar reason 
I cannot see why we should designate as thinking the language processes 
which are merely one expression of it. Like Miss Smith and Mr Bartlett, I do 
not agree that "when we study the way a golfer stands in addressing his ball 
and swinging his club we are studying golf "1 in any complete sense of the 
word 'study.' We are merely observant spectators of a temporary expression, 
or acute symptom. Moreover, if we think that this is studying golf, are we not 
exemplifying perfectly the shortcomings of most lookers-on at games, and 
perhaps, too, at behaviour? 
To me it seems that 'golf' may mean: 
(1) The exhibition of the player's actions to others. 
(2) The 'feel,' 'look' and 'sound' to the golfer of his own temporary 
activity. (For obvious reasons, I am here avoiding the terms 'introspection,' 
'sensation' and 'image.') 
(3) The knowledge, which may or may not express itself in action, 
speech or writing, of the collection of rules, customs and traditions which 
constitute golf. 
(4) That kinaesthetic knowledge which the arrogance of our intellect sets 
aside from other knowledge, calling it skill. 
If we watch the apparently careless ease of a first-class skater, and then 
inspect the figure which he has traced, are we studying 'skating'? If so, we are 
adopting a method of investigation which, unless supple- 
1 P. 326. 
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mented, will carry us only a little way towards appreciating what the skater 
himself means by skating, or understanding how the geometrical simplicity of 
the figure is paralleled by the extraordinary physiological and psychological 
difficulties in cutting it. So it would seem to be with our thinking; the words 
which express its results to others, or even to ourselves, are often but ready-
made suits which we catch up for want of better ones to hand, which clothe 
our thoughts but baggily and hide their individuality of outline. 
4.  THE ROLE OF IMAGERY IN THINKING. 
I have tried my hardest, and have failed, to find a way of discussing 
briefly the subject of this Symposium without mentioning the behaviourist's 
attack upon the doctrine of the image. And the reasons for my failure seem to 
be these; first, that it seems impossible, at this stage of our knowledge, to 
discuss thinking without mentioning imagery, secondly, that Professor 
Watson's account of the commonest type of imagery— visual—seems to me 
questionable, thirdly, that I am far from convinced that he has made out a 
case for the dismissal of the image from psychology. I must therefore discuss 
briefly some aspects of the relations between thinking and imagery. 
The raw material upon which thinking operates, and without which it 
cannot exist, is composed of selections from revived experiences. What shall 
such raw material be called? I should be inclined to say that it consisted 
largely of ideas, in Professor Stout's sense of the term1, and notions, in 
Professor Ogden's2. But this at once exposes me to criticism from Professor 
Watson, for an idea is a significant mental image, an image plus its meaning, 
and a notion is "a content of experience that sums up in a nuclear form a 
series of experiences which, in extenso, would involve sensations, images and 
affections." And it is just the "fiction" of images, with their aliases—" 
centrally aroused sensations " and the like—, which behaviourists assert must 
be destroyed. In 1914, Professor Watson admits that the inclusion of the 
image weakens the claims of the behaviourist, and adds that "it seems wisest, 
even at the cost of exposing the weakness of our position, to attack rather 
than to remain upon the defensive."3 
The three pages which follow this statement indicate some directions 
along which an attack might some day be conducted, but, surely, little 
1 Manual of Psychology, London, 1904 (2nd edition), 410. 
2 Introduction to General Psychology, London, 1916, 90. 
3 B. 17. 
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else. And in 1919 the word image does not appear in his book, because 
Professor Watson finds that he can "get along without it" (p. viii). Yet in the 
intervening years scores of investigators have been studying thousands of 
cases in which the main focus of interest has centered upon what the ordinary 
psychologist calls images. The obsessive memories, dreams, and 
hallucinations of the war-neuroses—more especially of the anxiety-neuroses, 
where the behaviour and speech of the patient often triumphantly succeeded 
in concealing his thoughts—all these have flooded the literature of 
psychology. Few other psychologists, especially perhaps those dealing with 
hallucinations and dreams, seem to have rejected the conception of imagery, 
and neither those three pages in 1914 nor the 1919 book convince me that 
Professor Watson can dispense with it. 
I hope it is clear that I am not here asserting or denying the existence of 
any metaphysical differences between image and percept, nor am I venturing 
any risky speculation as to whether they differ psychologically in ' texture.' 
But at present, being concerned merely with the province and methods of 
psychology, I cannot see that Professor Watson has adduced evidence 
sufficient to bring about the abandonment of the study of 'imagery' by 
'introspection.' Moreover, the events which have occurred since his first book 
was published would appear to have made it obvious that the introspective 
approach in psychology cannot yet be abandoned. I am therefore inclined to 
agree with those writers who hold that behaviourists should widen their 
scheme in order to admit the image. 
5.  Is THE BEHAVIOURIST'S EXPLANATION OF 'IMAGELESS THINKING' 
ADEQUATE? 
Let us now discuss the case in which this debatable entity, the image, 
becomes unimportant for the purpose of discussion or vanishes altogether; 
viz. that of 'imageless thought,' or, to put it more narrowly, of certain 
experiences termed 'awareness of meaning,' in which images are 
undiscoverable even by expert introspection. If such awareness of meaning be 
no longer 'carried by' images, even by images of words, spoken, heard or 
seen, this would seem to be the place for a behaviourist's theory of thinking. 
Such imageless awareness, leading perhaps to imageless thinking, may be 
'carried by' or 'go on in terms of implicit language, or may be identifiable with 
implicit language itself. I include both possibilities, for I am not always quite 
certain whether Professor Watson favours one or the other. He says of " 
reasoning, imagery, etc."... 
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"such processes are dependent upon language or upon a set of similarly 
functioning bodily habits put on after language habits1"; the latter expressing 
the means by which we have "short-circuited (substituted for) the word 
system of thought2." 
Now it is just the latter which enable Professor Watson to give a negative 
answer to the straight question "Do we always think in terms of words?" and 
thereby to escape, at least for the moment, the difficult task of explaining 
how it is that a man may sit for an hour unable to put his thoughts into words; 
how we may remember the meaning of an epigram, of a poem, or of a 
philosophical theory and yet be utterly unable to recall the words in which it 
was expressed. But of such bodily habits the examples which he gives are 
simple movements like the nod of affirmation, the shrug of the shoulders, or 
"winking, which expresses a whole series of words." 
Presumably, being gestures, they eke out the inadequacy of the words. We 
all tend to use them, for instance, when floundering in a foreign language. But 
is it possible to believe that a political philosopher's awareness of the meaning 
of 'international relations' might consist in the mere articulation of the phrase, 
with or without the help of a wink, however subtle? An old-fashioned 
psychologist, while admitting that the articulation of the words and even the 
wink, the shrug or the nod might bear some of the weight of the awareness of 
meaning, would have shifted most of the support to the image. A less old-
fashioned psychologist, believing that awareness of meaning might exist 
without imagery, or at any rate with the most tenuous, unsubstantial shred of 
it, would probably admit the participation of the words and the bodily habit. 
But to make them solely responsible for the awareness of the meaning of, say, 
the theory of relativity seems going too fast. To quote from Professor Watson: 
"the train of thoughts going on in your mind, according to the upholders of 
the image, has no adequate behaviour counterpart while it is in transit."3 The 
difficult word here seems to be adequate. Most people would admit that many 
trains of thought may have adequate behaviour counterparts, but what is the 
really adequate behaviour counterpart to the full awareness of the meaning of 
V — 1, unless it be the formation of the words or written symbols? But it is 
just this that many abstract thinkers deny. For if they be thinking in words 
(not in images of words, for that is not admitted by the behaviourists, but in 
actual word experiences), why, when they struggle for hours with 
1 B. 334. 2 Ibid. 332. 
3 B. 17. 
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thoughts which are difficult to express, don't they just write them down and have 
done with it? 
It would really seem that if the words are there we ought to be more conscious of 
them than, unfortunately, some of us are. For it seems unlikely that the behaviourist, 
of all persons, could wish to suppose the presence of words which are unconscious, in 
the sense that we have never yet been conscious of them. Yet how does he explain the 
common experience of waiting for a suitable epithet to drop off our pen; when we 
know "how we feel" about a subject, but cannot find a word? One day, in writing of a 
person's life work, I found myself clearly conscious not only of the aspect which I 
wished to describe, but also of the fact that the word in my mind—' exact'—was not 
the word I wanted. Next there came, to my surprise, a visual image of a flat piece of 
dough, upon which a ring-shaped tin cutter promptly descended, cleanly detaching 
from it a circular disc. Then, and not till then, my pen wrote the word for which I had 
been waiting,—' precise.' As far as I know, I had never before noticed the derivation 
of this word and its connexion with cutting. Now, if the behaviourist will allow that 
both the image of the pastry-cutter which came first and the word which followed, 
represented the meaning, we might come to terms, provided we agree that the 
awareness of this particular meaning, i.e. of the preciseness of the whole of a 
scientist's descriptive writings, was supported by, but by no means confined in, either 
of them. 
6.  THE APPEAL OF BEHAVIOURISM TO CERTAIN TYPES OF MIND. 
But this leads on to another question which appears to me to be inevitable,—
whether some features of Professor Watson's exposition may be expressions of his 
own predominant kinds of imagery. If, taking some of his phrases, the reader will 
study the context in which they occur: the "fiction of visual imagery"; "kinaesthetic 
substitutes for imagery," when what he is describing seem rather to be kinaesthetic 
accompaniments (B. 18); "had the idea of the image not taken such firm hold upon 
us... " (B. 20); that under "more constructive language types of activities" he includes 
the plan of a novel, the painting of a masterpiece and the composition of a great opera 
(P. 225); "dreams are word-reactions"; and his account of his own experiences—that 
before tearing off the leaf of his calendar he says aloud "tear off leaf," and that if he 
thinks the words "tear off leaf," "the words must be uttered silently before the habitual 
act arises" (B. 333); that hesitation before going to the races is expressed (in the 
reader, according to the text, but surely 
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rather in Professor Watson!) in "conflicting word processes" and "that the final word 
act issues" (P. 332); that "in watching a fight we tend to ward off a blow or strike a 
blow" (P. 108), and compare them with his statement "... closer examination leads me 
to deny in my own case the presence of imagery in the Galtonian sense1," this 
supposition seems to be justified. 
One comment upon this is that it would be interesting to know how much of this 
knowledge was obtained by any process other than that which psychologists usually 
call introspection; another that the data of introspection should be verified by 
observations made upon large numbers of very different types of mentality; still 
another, that not only has Professor Watson no right to implicate the helpless reader 
by his use of 'we' and 'you' but that introspective study of imagery makes most 
psychologists, in writing upon such a subject, hesitate to use even the impersonal 
'one.' 
For to a visualiser, though this account of the "fiction of visual imagery" 
certainly seems stranger than fiction, it is hard to believe that it is truth. Take for 
instance the statement2: "There are probably in most cases kinaesthetic substitutes for 
imagery. Concurrently with the articulated word apple3, there arise associated 
kinaesthetic impulses in eye muscles. If these latter are strong, one can see how the 
fiction of visual imagery might arise." 
Comment has already been made upon the first sentence in this quotation. The 
second apparently assumes (for it is difficult to give it any other meaning) that when 
we image an apple we faintly articulate the word. But do all of us? The other night I 
said to a friend that a piece of silk needed ' oiling.' At the time I said it I knew quite 
well that it was crumpled, and I had a perfectly clear knowledge of the process 
necessary to restore its shape, viz. ironing. But if my thought of the process of ironing 
included the "faintly articulated word" 'ironing,' or other "kinaesthetic substitutes for 
imagery," presumably the articulation of the word and the kinaesthetic substitutes 
which correspond to ironing should have prevented the mistake. 
Concerning the third sentence of the last quoted statement, there seem to be two 
difficulties: 
(1) The consciousness of the movements of the eyes necessary to fixate an apple, 
or even to follow its outline, is one type of mental process, that of its colours as 
imaged appears to be quite another. 
1 Psychol Rev. 1913, xx. 173. 2 B. 18. 
3 Italics in text. 
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(2) What little experimental (behaviouristic) evidence we have seems to 
be against the probability that there is any close connexion even between the 
eye-movements and the shape of an object, though Professor Watson says (P. 
324) "we have learned to draw objects and to trace them with the eyes." This 
sentence seems to contradict the findings of experimental aesthetics1. 
To sum up this section, I cannot help feeling that the above account may 
be true of the 'motor-minded' person whose visual imagery is weak, but that it 
should be supplemented by accounts from the large numbers of persons 
whose powers have been bestowed in the inverse relation. It would be leading 
this discussion too far from its subject to speculate to what extent the 
extrovert type of mind tends to welcome behaviourism, the introvert to 
consider it inadequate. But a discussion between Professor Watson and Mr 
Henry James, with, perhaps, Professor William James acting as interpreter, 
would have been invaluable. 
7.  BEHAVIOURISM AND THE PROBLEM OF MEANING. 
As I have indicated before, I cannot make up my mind whether the 
behaviourist really claims that the awareness of meaning is 'carried by' (or 
'goes on in terms of) these language processes, or is identifiable with them. In 
either case it would be interesting to read a behaviouristic explanation of 
those experimental investigations of thinking which make it difficult to 
harmonize the laws which govern the memory of meanings with those which 
govern the memory of words2; why we can learn fifteen pairs of similar 
meanings in one repetition, each meaning being expressed in perhaps five 
words, while no such happy facility is displayed in learning paired 
vocabularies; why two meanings may be associated with the greatest ease 
although the words which express them have never been in consciousness 
together or even in immediate succession; why the second ' half-thoughts' in a 
series will at once associate themselves, and retroactively, with their partners 
in a series read some time before; why the subject may give the right thought 
in the wrong words. I cannot yet understand all this on the supposition that 
thinking consists merely in the action of language mechanisms. 
When we recall Professor James's description of thought as a series of 
flights and perchings, it seems that the behaviourist has given us an account 
of some kinds of perchings, and, fascinating as it is, it reads like 
1 See Valentine, The Psychology of Beauty, London, 44 f. 
2 Cf. Külpe," Ueber die moderne Psychologie des Denkens," Internationale Monatsschrift 
series, and the work of the Wurzburg school generally. 
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a description of flying by an aerodrome mechanic, who sees only the last 
stages of the aviator's descent. But, to the upholders of the image, as well as 
to the behaviourist, the 'awareness of meaning' still remains an unsolved 
problem. Even if it turns out to be incipient behaviour, there will, probably, 
still be room for its study, from the inside, by introspection. 
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